Mission Accomplished

Mikhail Saakashvili hurt his folks. The crisis provoked with the attack on the separatist forces in South Ossetia did not unfold according to the previsions of the Georgian President. The West stood and watched, Russia did not. Moscow’s reaction was furious, extending over the entire Georgia territory in just a few hours. Yesterday the world finally sighed in relief. With a brief statement in front of the cameras Russian President Medvedev declared the end of the military operations: ”The goal has been accomplished. The aggressor in South Ossetia has been punished. Now we can again guarantee the safety of the Russian peace keeping troups and our co-nationals.” Georgia gets a rude awakening from her Western dream, whereas it is already clear that Russia has obtained much more than a simple restoring of the status quo.

The recent war was a predictable outcome of the almost 20-year long low intensity conflict between Moscow and Tbilisi. At the time of the declaration of Georgian independence, in 1991, the separatists in South Ossetia, with support from Moscow, claimed their right to independence from Georgia. Until present day the region has maintained the status of de facto independence, unrecognized by any members of the international community.

Tension rose after the election of Mikhail Saakashvili in 2004. The new President has immediately declared the goal of returning South Ossetia and Abkhazia (another separatist region in the north-west of the country) under Georgian control. International law supports Tbilisi. Both regions were within Georgian administrative borders, as defined at the time of the Soviet Union. However, Moscow insists that the same standards as those for Kosovo have to apply to the question of South Ossetia. Or, even better, that the question is not addressed at all. Russia actually prefers a situation of stable instability which is the best barrier against the pro-Atlantic and pro-Western ambitions of its neighbours.

Over the past years Georgia has embarked on a massive program of military upgrade. This was supported by the United States also in view of Georgia’s participation in the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq. Last week President Saakashvili must have thought that the alliance with the United States would be a factor strong enough to support such a military offensive in Osetia. That hope vanished within hours. Georgia’s position promptly appeared feeble in view of the balance of forces on the ground clearly in favour of Moscow. The result is here for all of us to see. But it could have been worse. While the dead, wounded, as well as the thousands of refugees from this last war on European soil are being counted, many are asking what would have happened if at the Bucharest summit NATO had accepted Tbilisi’s request to join the Alliance. NATO is based on the principle of solidarity among members in case each one of them comes under attack. Had Georgia been accepted into the club, it would have been difficult to get away with only a few declarations.

If hopefully over, this war did not solve anything. The core problem, concerning the numerous frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, remains. It is not only South Ossetia. There are also Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Nagorno Karabakh. This war gave Russia the opportunity to demonstrate force, to show that it is a great power without whose consent there can be no change of borders or power balances. Military solutions are clearly unacceptable, but neither is continuing to ignore these conflicts. This area at the frontier of the European Union is of fundamental importance not only for issues concerning energy, but for the stability of the EU itself. If Brussels does not engage meaningfully with Russia and the situation in the Caucasus, it risks repeating the same mistakes as in the Balkans in the 90s. And it risks paying the same price. A strong diplomatic initiative is needed in order to confront these crises and the parties involved. With the power of words, not of the weapons. Although now it will be more difficult.